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Brexit, similar to Donald Trump’s victory in the 2016 US presidential elections, is 
frequently interpreted as a manifestation or result of the growing anger with the 
political and economic status quo and a victory for populism.  In this article, I 
examine the relationship between social movements, Brexit and social policy. 
Contextualizing my discussion in the literatures on social movements and social 
policy, I consider how political and socio-economic developments since the 2008 
financial crisis contributed to and helped create a fertile ground for Brexit. In 
examining the context within which Brexit occurred, I query the assumption that 
Brexit was a result of the losers of or those left behind by globalization and 
problematize the accounts which proclaim the death of democracy and the rise of the 
age of authoritarianism (Keane, 2009, Plattner, 2015, Appadurai, 2017). Instead, I 
explore why and how actors from across the ideological spectrum supported Brexit 
and examine the sources of discontent which created a fertile ground from which 
Brexit emerged. To understand the relationship, role and impact of social movements 
and more widely, civil society, on social policy, I argue that it is important to 
critically examine how diverse actors within civil society are campaigning for the 
recognition of unmet needs and challenging systems of redistribution and the ways in 
which they interact and engage with governance institutions and policy processes. 
As I present some material from our interviews conducted with activists in 
London in 2013-14, there are two clarifications to make. First I acknowledge that 
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London is not representative of Britain.  Second, we were mostly interviewing 
activists who were on left of the political spectrum. I use the term “activist” to refer to 
those engaged in social movements.  “Activist”  is a slippery term, but drawing on the 
social movement literature, I understand being an activist as a collective identity 
linked to participation in a social movement or collective action
 
(Bobel, 2007).   
During our fieldwork my colleagues and I interviewed only those who had been 
deeply involved in the protests, for whom activism was an important time 
commitment and part of their identity, rather than occasional demonstrators.   
Social movements, collective action and social policy  
The literature on social movements examines the relationship between 
structural change and social transformation.  Scholars have analysed how social 
problems and discontent becomes the basis for collective action (Tilly and Tarrow, 
2007, Tarrow, 2011, Goodwin and Jasper, 2012) as well as the agency of movement 
actors (i.e., why individuals join or drop out) (Touraine, 1984, Wieviorka, 2005, 
Pleyers, 2011). Collective action is not outside of politics, but rather is the space 
through which  “ordinary people” come into confrontation with elites or authorities 
around a shared common purpose  (Tarrow, 2011: 9).    So as to understand how 
shared grievances become transformed into collective action, in  recent years 
sociological research on social movements (van Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 
2013) has also examined the role of emotions and “emotional dynamics”   during all 
the processes and phases of protest (Jasper, 2014: 208). Research on emotions 
examines how emotions can lead to collective action, but also result in demobilization 
and non-action.   
The question, which often follows those of why collective actions emerge and 
why individuals mobilize, is concerned with analysing movements’ success or impact 
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(Della Porta and Diani, 2006, Rochon and Mazmanian, 1993, Giugni, 1998, Weldon, 
2011).  In the narrowest sense, impact is often interpreted as a change in legislation or 
the adoption of a new policy instrument.  Such a narrow or what some call a 
productivist understanding of impact (Castells, 2012) ignores how movements engage 
with and seek to shape wider public debates, social policies, and  attitudes. In this 
article, my aim is to examine the context from which Brexit emerged and became 
possible, but also to problematize some of the reigning assumptions about it.   
In 2010, two years after the 2008 financial crisis, we saw the explosion of 
protest movements throughout the globe.  It is important to recall that these were 
movements that were against austerity and inequality and for greater democracy, 
dignity, and social justice (Ishkanian and Glasius, 2018).   Many writing about recent 
movements argue that the protests and occupation of squares beginning in 2010 were 
an expression of anger and reflected growing concerns around the lack of democracy, 
social justice and dignity (Kaldor and Selchow, 2012, Glasius and Pleyers, 2013, 
Tejerina et al., 2013, Della Porta, 2015), representing a tipping point in a 
globalization of discontent (Biekart and Fowler, 2013) and indignation (Calhoun, 
2013).  Yet because of their progressive demands,  horizontal forms of organizing,  
and participatory nature, the global wave of protests, including those of the Arab 
Spring, the Spanish and Greek Indignados, Gezi Park, and Occupy were also 
described as movements of hope (Flaherty, 2016, Castells, 2012, Boukalaa and 
Dimitrakopoulou, 2017). Thus, positive (i.e., hope) and negative (i.e., anger, 
indignation) emotions drove people to the streets and squares. 
It has now become clear that the prospects of activists’ demands as well as 
their conceptions and practices of democracy, social justice, and participation 
bleeding outward and upward into the transformation of society and of political 
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decision-making are very bleak. Instead, in the UK, in the US and all over the western 
world, nativist, right-wing populist movements have been on a rising trajectory, based 
at least in part on very similar sentiments of discontent with electoral politics and 
neoliberal policies. And we increasingly hear about the crisis,  death, and decline of 
and fatigue with democracy (Keane, 2009, Flinders, 2016, Plattner, 2015, Appadurai, 
2017). Scholars and pundits argue that we are now living in the period of the “great 
regression” (Geiselberger, 2017), which is also characterised as the “age of anger” 
(Mishra, 2017).   
The UK-focused social policy literature which examines the role of civil 
society in policy shaping and implementation, has tended to overwhelmingly focus on 
how formal, professionalized  voluntary or third sector organisations have developed 
partnerships with the State (Alcock, 2010, Billis, 1993, Deakin, 2001, Harris, 2010, 
Lewis, 1999), their comparative advantage and efficacy in delivering services (Billis 
and Glennerster, 1998, Harris et al., 2001), and the challenges they face in 
maintaining their independence and autonomy in the wake of funding cuts and 
increasing reliance on contracting  (Milbourne and Cushman, 2015, Murray and 
Milbourne, 2017, Deakin, 2014, Rochester, 2013). There has been far less focus on 
more contentious civil society actors, including social movements and informal, 
grassroots groups, which are less interested in working in partnership with the State 
and instead contest and critique existing policies and campaign for the recognition of 
unmet or unrecognized needs (Powell, 2009, Halfpenny and Reid, 2002, Milbourne 
and Murray, 2017, Rochester, 2013, Martin, 2001, Ishkanian and Ali, 2018) 
In examining Brexit, it is important to recall that what we would eventually 
become the Vote Leave, grew out of the campaign which started in 1975 regarding 
the UK’s withdrawal from the membership of the European Common Market, which 
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it had only joined two years’ prior. I agree with Della Porta who maintains that we 
should view both the Brexit and Trump campaigns as “other forms of populist 
politics” rather than social movements (Della Porta, 2017: 27).  But even if we agree 
with Della Porta that Brexit was a form of “populist politics” rather than a social 
movement, what constitutes populism remains difficult to define.   Laclau (1977) 
characterized populism as an empty signifier which is defined by antagonistic 
frontiers and rejecting analyses of populism that focus on ideological content, he 
noted that there can be both right and left populisms.  Yet even if we focus on form 
rather than content, the task of defining populism remains difficult for as Müller 
maintains, that there isn’t yet a “theory of populism” which provides us with 
“coherent criteria for deciding when political actors turn populist” (Müller 2017: 2) 
[emphasis in the original].  
Regardless of whether we consider Brexit a form of populist politics or simply 
as a specific, political issue or demand, I show below how similar to many recent 
movements, Brexit had a heterogeneous base of supporters, (Peterson et al., 2015). I 
discuss how Brexit brought together individuals with grievances around the current 
economic and political context but who hold diverse political and ideological views 
and allegiances, or in some instances, no allegiances at all.  This illustrates how the 
issue became a touchstone for diverse grievances.  While I acknowledge the limits of 
social movement theories in explaining phenomenon such as Brexit, I argue that these 
theories remain useful in helping us to analyse how shared grievances are transformed 
(or not)  into action.   
In the sections below I explore why and how actors from across the 
ideological spectrum supported Brexit and examine the sources of discontent which 
coalesced into a victory for Leave. Drawing on empirical research with activists in 
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London conducted in 2013-2015, I discuss their discontent and demands as existed in 
the period after the crisis leading up to Brexit to argue that one of the driving factors 
for recent discontent is neoliberalism.  By examining at the different actors and their 
critiques of the status quo, I highlight that while there may be shared grievances, the 
diverse groups who express anger with the current situation do not share common 
explanations or solutions.  
 Brexit’s heterogeneous supporters  
In analyzing Brexit and Trump, and the rise of authoritarian populism 
elsewhere, it is common to read of how those left-behind by globalization have lashed 
out in anger against the current political elites and wider system which they believe 
has impoverished them.  Such analyses are hardly new and scholars, including Kriesi 
and others, have analysed the so-called winners and losers of globalization in the 
2000s noting the growing nativism, xenophobia and anti-immigrant claims (Kriesi et 
al., 2008).  Since the Brexit referendum, there have been a bevy of post-mortem 
reports. One such report, commissioned by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation, explains 
the Brexit vote by arguing that those on the margins of society, living on low incomes, 
with few qualifications and without the skills required to prosper in the modern economy, 
were more likely than others to vote “Leave”.  According to the report’s authors, “Groups 
in Britain who have been ‘left behind’ by rapid economic change and feel cut adrift from 
the mainstream consensus were the most likely to support Brexit” (Goodwin and Heath, 
2016: 3). While emphasizing the socio-economic drivers for Leave, they also 
acknowledge that educational attainment, geography, attitudes, and values all matter.  In 
particular, they argue that low educational qualifications, socially conservative views, and 
a very strong sense of English identity predisposed people towards Leave (Goodwin and 
Heath 2016: 18).  Kaufman argues against the economic inequality argument, maintaining 
it was all about culture and attitudes. Drawing on the British Election Study 2015 
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Internet Panel and census data, he unequivocally concludes that, “All told, the Brexit 
story is mainly about values, not economic inequality” (Kaufman, 2016).  Another 
report, this one published by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, finds that Brexit was 
overwhelmingly supported by those on the right and that support for UK far-right groups 
“gained significant number of followers” from the Brexit campaign (Smith and Colliver, 
2016: 1).  While Smith and Colliver acknowledge that the Leave campaign “actively 
sought to distance itself from the UK far-right movements”, they maintain that the 
xenophobic narratives “resonated and gained traction with communities who felt they had 
lost control, or simply lost out, because of national immigration policy” adding that 
inevitably “parallels were drawn between the narratives of the two” (Smith and Colliver, 
2016: 2). But this is hardly the whole story.  In addition to those so-called losers of 
globalization, Brexit supporters included many winners, including those with high 
educational qualifications and incomes.  Nick Clegg, the former leader of the Liberal 
Democrats,  describes the elite Brexiteers as follows:   
…the hedge-fund managers for whom EU-wide regulations are an 
overburdensome [sic] hindrance to their financial aspirations… the owners 
and editors of the rightwing press, whose visceral loathing of the EU has 
shaped their respective papers’ tone and coverage for decades; the Tory 
backbenchers, many of whom still inhabit a preposterous past in which 
Britannia still rules the waves and diplomacy is best conducted from the royal 
yacht; a handful of multi-millionaire businessmen who have, in some cases 
over 30 years or more, bankrolled whichever party, or politician, stands on the 
most aggressive EU-bashing platform (Wintour, 2017) 
 
Finally, alongside the so-called left-behind and the financial elites that 
supported Brexit, there was also a group of Brexit supporters on the political left  who 
are sometimes referred to as Lexiteers.  Lexiteers by and large reject the xenophobic 
anti-immigration arguments which they ascribe to the right-wing “big business” and 
“little-Englander” Leave campaigns (Choonara, 2015: 3)  arguing instead  that their 
opposition to the EU is based on socialist principles and is based on advancing 
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workers’ rights and anti-racist policies. According to the chair of the Left Leave 
group, Brexit supporters on the left reject the “anti-foreigner kind of nonsense” 
(Zagoria, 2017) and base their support for Brexit on the premise that the EU is 
promoting an anti-democratic neoliberal agenda which advances “market rather than 
collective planning” (Tuck, 2016).   They cite the EU’s support for free movement as 
“based on a desire to create a European-wide labour force that can be profitably 
exploited by capital” (Choonara, 2015: 3) and argue that post-EU immigration 
controls would put the interests of British workers first. One such Lexit supporter, 
Labour MP Frank Field, argues in The Guardian for greater immigration control in 
the following way. He writes,  
It’s not racist to worry about this [immigration control] as some of my 
colleagues seem to think, and there’s broad support for more control of 
immigration among all Britain’s ethnic minority communities… a post-EU 
immigration regime can support our public services, expand our economy and 
also deliver humanitarian objectives; but because it will be under our control 
there won’t be unexpected and excessive pressures on our schools, hospitals 
and public infrastructure (Field, 2016). 
 
Harvard academic and Lexit supporter Richard Tuck, similarly argues that  a planned 
welfare state, which is “the traditional heart of modern left-wing politics…is rendered 
virtually impossible if Britain stays in the EU since no one will have any idea of the 
population numbers” (Tuck, 2016).  Lexiteers maintain that the referendum has 
“broken the neoliberal consensus, and alerted the establishment to the polling power 
of the “left behind”(Buxton, 2017).   
As I have discussed in this section, it is far too simplistic to describe all Brexit 
supporters as ascribing to a particular ideological position or indeed of being driven 
by common concerns or grievances.  A more nuanced interpretation, should consider 
how Brexit wasn’t just the outcome of the so-called left behind voting out of anger 
and fear, but to consider how the issue became flashpoint for varied grievances.  
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Moreover, what is often ignored in the discussions about the so-called winners and 
losers of globalisation is that many of the people who are now protesting in the 
streets, not for Brexit necessarily and often against it, are people who in recent years 
would have been described as the winners of globalisation.  As   Della Porta writes, 
“…they are the well-educated and the mobile, once described as globalization’s 
‘winners’, but far from enjoying such a self-perception today” (Della Porta, 2017: 30) 
and as Streeck maintains, in the wake of the  2008 financial crisis  “…the number of 
‘globalization losers’ has been steadily growing”(Streeck, 2017: 161). “Left-behind” 
is a fluid rather than a static category  and that even those who may have in the past 
been described as “winners” of globalization (i.e., young, middle-class, university 
graduates) are now are facing increased precarity in the job market, growing personal 
(including student) debt, and even relative poverty.  
  Indeed, analysis of recent protests movements have repeatedly illustrated how 
the 2008 crisis and the ensuing austerity negatively impacted a wide set of the 
population, including young people,  pensioners, public sector workers, and those 
who were previously considered middle class  (Simiti, 2017, Matsaganis and Leventi, 
2014, Joya, 2011, Tejerina et al., 2013).  For example, drawing on my own research 
with anti-austerity activists in London, I found that many activists who identified as 
middle class, expressed a deep concern for growing inequality, precarity, loss of 
opportunities, and lack of voice.   Charlie,
1
 who at the time of the interview as in his 
early 30s and was employed in a NGO, said,  
I and a lot of my friends [in group] are between 20-30 years old…They are 
highly educated, they feel highly passionate, a sense of despondency, a sense 
of betrayal, hopelessness - about the climate, about the war in Iraq and the 
complete failure on the part of the political leadership to in any way challenge 
the status quo and make fundamental changes in people’s lives.  
 
                                                        
1 All names have been changed and pseudonyms are used to refer to the interviewees. 
10 
 
William, a professional in his late 50s, was active in the Occupy movement 
which he characterized as “a very broad church of dissatisfaction” adding, “…the 
overriding message of Occupy from its spontaneity and the way it rolled across the 
globe was just a demonstration of anger at just the way we're being governed and 
manipulated”.  During the fieldwork (2013-2015) Brexit was not mentioned by any 
respondent and it did not feature prominently in the mainstream press. I cannot, nor 
do I wish to speculate, how William, Charlie, or indeed any of our respondents voted 
in the referendum. Rather, I wish to illustrate that the discontent with the status quo 
was shared widely and that Brexit emerged from this context of discontent, anger, and 
indignation.  While the anti-austerity movements, both in London and elsewhere, 
sought to be inclusive (Ishkanian and Glasius, 2017) as noted by the activists quoted 
in this article, there were those who did not engage or join.  I do not wish to speculate 
on the reasons behind a lack of participation, but it is important to keep in mind that 
non-engagement in a movement or collective action does not mean absence of 
discontent or grievances.   
Therefore rather than writing off those with grievances as losers, the left-
behind, and even more problematically, as “deplorables” (Clinton, 2016) or “victims” 
who are “fearful, angry, and resentful of what their societies have done for them and 
to them” (Appadurai 2017: 2), a more robust and empirically grounded analysis is 
required to understand the complex political reconfigurations and shifting alliances 
which have contributed to Brexit and the rise of Trump. This in turn can inform our 
thinking of how social policy can mitigate social conflicts and advance greater social 
justice and cohesion.  If nothing is done to recognize and address the social and 
economic drivers which contribute to rising discontent, populist politicians from 
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Trump to Farage will continue to tap into the anger by creating a divisive politics of 
us versus them.   
The trouble with neoliberalism  
Brexit exposed deep fissures and cleavages in British society, and as many 
argue, neoliberal policies have not only deepened inequality and poverty but are also 
deeply anti-democratic (Brown, 2015, Merkel, 2014a, Streeck, 2014). While I agree 
with those who argue that  we should embrace a “more nuanced approach” which 
views neoliberalism as a “mobile technology” or “logic” which mutates as it travels 
rather than “a fixed set of attributes with predetermined outcomes” (Collier, 2012, 
Ong, 2007: 3), most authors writing about neoliberalism  agree that at a minimum, 
neoliberalism entails a focus on individual responsibility rather than collective 
meeting of needs (George and Wilding, 1994, Harvey, 2007, Dwyer, 1998, 
MacGregor, 2005) and that as an ideological position, neoliberalism is characterised 
by a hostility to the “public realm” representing instead policies which are a 
combination of anti-welfarism and anti-statism (Clarke, 2004: 30).  
The global wave of protests of the early 2010s were as much concerned with 
the economy as with the political system (Ishkanian and Glasius, 2018), moreover, as 
already stated, they  brought together individuals with shared grievances around the 
status quo. As such, they can be seen as embodying  what Laclau and Mouffe call 
“diverse antagonisms and points of rupture” (1985: 191). Contrary to those who argue 
that democracy is in decline or that there is fatigue with democracy (Appadurai, 2017, 
Plattner, 2015, Merkel, 2014b), through our comparative research with movements in 
Europe, North Africa, and in Asia, my colleagues and I found that activists almost 
universally rejected representative democracy as a sufficient model but that  rather 
than feeling fatigued with democracy, they wanted more, real democracy which they 
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understood as being a process-oriented notion of active citizenship that places strong 
demands both on the citizens themselves and on those, at all levels, who govern them 
(Ishkanian and Glasius, 2017). They argued that democracy means having a voice, a 
right, and even a responsibility to participate in politics and the public life of the 
commons and moreover, they developed more demanding practices and ideas of what 
democracy should mean, ideas that are not idiosyncratic, but resonate with each other 
and with certain writings in political theory. Activists in these movements also 
developed solidarity and self-help practices, which were intended as political 
interventions, rather than philanthropic acts of charity, through which people began to 
confront the state with its failure to meet its responsibilities to its citizens, including, 
but not limited to, providing basic services.  These forms of solidaristic action 
represent an inherent rejection and subversion of the neoliberal logic of individual 
responsibility that goes well beyond the expression of grievances 
A number of scholars writing about the resilience of neoliberalism argue that 
civil society actors, and in particular social movements, have an important role to play 
in articulating challenges against neoliberal ideas and policies (Crouch, 2011, Peck et 
al., 2012, Thatcher and Schmidt, 2013). Yet  critical scholars who have examined the 
relationship between democracy and neoliberalism, maintain that that democracy will 
be in crisis until such time as the problems created by capitalism and neoliberalism 
are addressed (Della Porta, 2015, Crouch, 2011, Keane, 2009, Merkel, 2014, Streeck, 
2014).  While they recognise the importance of movements in challenging prevailing 
views, they also acknowledge how inequalities of power between movements and 
market and state institutions may limit their impact (Badiou and Gauchet, 2016, 
Brown, 2015).  
   My colleagues and I have examined and analysed the driving factors, 
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demands, repertoires of action, and mobilizing strategies and practices elsewhere 
(Glasius and Ishkanian, 2015). In this article, I focus on the reality that however 
inclusive and participatory the movements sought to be, they cannot be said to have 
been entirely representative. Indeed, the activists we interviewed in London spoke 
of their concerns that many who were worst hit by the crisis and subsequent 
austerity policies were not very engaged with or integrated into the anti-austerity 
struggle. Luke, early 50s, who was involved in a grassroots anti-austerity campaign 
and is also a trade union activist described the growing poverty and inequality in his 
London borough as providing “fertile ground” for the rise of the far right. He said,  
I am not saying there is no racism, it is latent…Look, there are lots of people 
living on these council estates who are very isolated and very angry. These 
[far right] forces could easily organize them. It’s ripe for organizing.  Some 
people in the Labour Party are what I call bleeding heart liberals and they 
don’t see any of that. But I am from a working class background and I know 
that it could happen. I just hope it never does happen.  
 
 Jack, early 20s, who was involved in the student movement against fees and 
cuts argued that while students had an outlet to express their anger he worried that 
“…the white working class don’t have those opportunities, might associate with a 
hooliganistic type of nationalist politics…Politics in the EU will become a lot more 
populist, without a doubt.” For Mia late 40s, the shift to the right was hardly new. She 
said,  
If you look at what’s happening across Europe fascism is growing.  People 
might not think the EDL [English Defence League] is much of a threat, they 
are just football hooligans on the street, but actually they are growing as a 
result of the crisis.  They are allowed to promote the hatred out in the street, 
they are given lots of air time on TV…What that does is fit into people who 
already have racist views who are looking for someone to blame because their 
job has been cut and their home is under threat. They are struggling and things 
are hard, they are looking for a scapegoat.  
 
While anti-austerity groups in England have raised concerns around the impacts of 
cuts on different groups of people, highlighted alternatives to austerity (e.g., cracking 
down on tax evasion), and demanded the reversals of the cuts, Government has yet to 
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substantively change course from the austerity agenda. This agenda, which was 
introduced by the 2010-2015 Coalition Government, led to the largest welfare 
spending cuts since 1921-24 (Lupton et al., 2013). Hence while we can analyse and 
argue over why the 2010+  movements emerged,  if we consider, purely from a policy 
perspective, what these movements achieved, then it is clear their impact has very 
limited (Ishkanian and Glasius, 2017).    Movements have shaped the political 
discourses and wider public discussions, issues such as inequality and tax justice, but 
apart from contributing to shifts in public discourse, there is little evidence that they 
are having a direct impact at the level of social policy, albeit, I recognize that impact 
as such is difficult to measure and attribute.  
 Jeremy Corbyn’s rise and election as Labour party leader and his explicit anti-
neoliberal stance has revitalized many on the left, yet he faces challenges from the 
Conservatives as well as those in his own party.  Moreover, like Bernie Sanders in the 
US,  Corbyn is often accused of promoting a type of left or socialist populism, which 
critics argue lacks fiscal constraint and discipline and is anti-business (Wolf, 2017).  
What we find then is that despite the growing discontent, it remains difficult to 
challenge  the position of TINA [there is no alternative]  and to formulate a critique of 
neoliberalism, without being  branded a regressive socialist who is reprimanded for 
“…being culturally and morally backward” (Streeck, 2017: 164) 
Post-Brexit: what role for social policy  
In this article, I examined the relationship between social movements, rising 
social discontent, Brexit, and social policy. Contextualizing my discussion in the 
literatures on social movements and social policy, I examined how political and socio-
economic developments since the 2008 financial crisis contributed to and helped 
create a fertile ground for Brexit. In discussing the context within which Brexit 
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occurred, I critically examined the assumption that Brexit was a result of the losers of 
or those left behind by globalization and problematize the accounts which proclaim 
the death of democracy and the rise of the age of authoritarianism.  Instead, I 
considered why and how actors from across the ideological spectrum supported Brexit 
and the sources of discontent which created a fertile ground from which Brexit 
emerged.  To understand the relationship, role and impact of social movements and 
more widely, civil society, on social policy, I argued that it is important to critically 
examine how diverse actors within civil society, are campaigning for the recognition 
of unmet needs and challenging systems of redistribution and the ways in which they 
interact and engage with the governance institutions and policy processes.  But I also 
maintained we need to recognise the limits of civil society or social movement 
influence on social policy.   
While acknowledging that social movements and activists have had limited 
impact in shaping the social policy agenda in the post-2008 period, nonetheless civil 
society actors, including both movement activists as well as voluntary sector 
professionals, are engaged in campaigning for the recognition of unmet needs and for 
fairer redistribution, by also highlighting emerging inequalities of experience, of 
opportunity, and outcome. 
 Gramsci famously used the term “interregnum” to describe a period of 
uncertainty during which the old system or order is dying and the new has yet to 
emerge. He wrote, “The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and 
the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms 
appear.”(Gramsci, 1978: 276).  In other words, we are in liminal, transition period, 
where there is a great deal of uncertainty, but also upheavals and danger.   As I write 
this, we are in the last days of 2017 where despite months of discussions, there is 
16 
 
hardly any further clarity where Brexit negotiations are headed and how a whole host 
of issues will be resolved.    All we know is that there is no guide map, that we are in 
uncharted waters, and given the political turbulence around Brexit negotiations, it is 
useless to speculate what Brexit will in the end mean.   And yet, the grievances that 
initially brought people into the squares and streets in protest, both with the political 
and economic status quo, have not been resolved and in some instances, they have 
been exacerbated. And as we have seen, drawing on the same sense of discontent with 
the status quo, populist politicians and parties have grown stronger.   Given the 
continuing discontent, anger and the fact movements keep coming up against 
unresponsive state structures, we can expect recurrent political mobilization, despite 
the claims of democracy fatigue and despondency.  So, the question remains, how 
will social policy makers respond?   
 The editors of this special issue argue that “the current problems in Europe, 
such as the crisis in democratic representation and the Brexit vote” among other 
development (e.g., ongoing sluggish economic performance with associated such as 
the crisis)   stem from the “overall neoliberal direction of the EU, and especially, the 
influence of Anglo-American countries in this regard” (Corbett and Walker 
forthcoming: page).  They suggest that “neglecting the social has weakened the 
progressive and integrative role of social policy over the last 40 years” (2018: page).   
Recalling the 1997 Amsterdam declaration on social quality of Europe and judging 
from the anti-austerity protests which emerged across Europe from 2011 onwards, 
including in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the UK, it is clear that 
although European social scientists raised the alarm, policy makers have not 
necessarily been listening and that they have not done enough over the past twenty 
years to “…create a social policy that has its own independent rationale and 
17 
 
legitimacy so as to counterbalance the dominance of economic and monetary policy 
within the EU” (Walker, 1998: 109).   
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